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CAVEAT PROMISSEE: NEBRASKA'S "NEW CONSIDERATION"
TEST AND THE ANACHRONISTIC STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Henry M. Grether*
A. Introduction

Nearly a quarter of a century ago Professor Maurice H. Merrill
made an exhaustive and analytical study of the Nebraska cases regarding suretyship.' Reading his work on this subject leads to the conclusion that in most instances the rules of suretyship in Nebraska
followed the views expressed by a majority of the other states and text
writers. One of the areas in which Professor Merrill discovered confusion and need for greater clarity concerned the so-called "leading
object" or "main purpose" rule, a doctrine which will take out of the
Statute of Frauds a promise to answer for another's debt. Professor
Merrill wrote, "The variety of the views presented and the irreconcilability of the cases suggest that it may be profitable to review all the
Nebraska cases dealing with new promises in the light of the various
theories. Such a survey might enable us to determine which view
most adequately reflects the law of Nebraska ... 2 Further, he concluded, ".. . a definite selection by the court of some one view as a basis
for its new promise decisions seems highly desirable." 3
The purpose of this article, written nearly a quarter of a century
after Professor Merrill's suggestion that our court select some definite
view, is to determine whether it is now possible to state the Nebraska
rule regarding the status and future of oral guarantees of another's preexisting duty. Incentive for this quest is furnished not only by lapse
of time since the aforementioned research, but also by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in King v. SchmaIl. 4
Evolution of the Statute of Frauds-1677-1954

To eliminate confusion between the "main purpose" doctrine and
other doctrines involved in the surety section of the Statute of Frauds,
particularly the confusion between the "main purpose" doctrine and
the "entire credit" test,5 the history of the statute and the evolution of
the cases construing it should be considered.
* Assistant Professor of Law University of Nebraska; assisted by Lawrence
L. Wilson, member of the junior class.
1
Merrill, Nebraska Suretyship, 8 Neb. L. Bull. (Parts I and II) 267, 413
(1929-1930); 9 Neb. L. Bull. (Part III) 421 (1930-1931); 10 Neb. L. Bull. (Parts
IV and V) 261, 405 (1931-1932).
- 8 Id. at 429.

8 Id. at 434.
'King v. Schmall, 156 Neb. 635, 57 N.W.2d 287 (1953).
This test ascertains whether credit was actually given to the surety or the
principal debtor. For a scholarly discussion of this test see Riesenfeld and
Mussman, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds: A Survey of the Minnesota
Law, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1946).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

The original enactment of the Statute of Frauds was in the year
1677.0 It was a very comprehensive act containing twenty-five sections
dealing with a great variety of subject matters but having a single purpose of preventing fraud and perjury. Of the original twenty-five
sections, only two, sections four and twenty-three, are still in force
in the original version, although parliament later incorporated some
of the repealed sections into other statutes. 7 It is also interesting that
section four, which includes the promise to answer for another's debt,
was not inserted until a later stage of the draft." More significant, however, is the fact that the English Law Revision Committee recommended in 1937 that section four be repealed.9 The report of this committee
contained both a majority ° and minority 1 report as to the advisability
of repealing the portion of section four that applies to contracts of
guaranty. The majority recommended that contracts of guaranty
should not be treated separately, while the minority report recommended that contracts of guaranty were of such a nature that a
signed writing should be made essential for this type of promise.
In the United States the controversy over the wisdom of requiring
a writing for contracts of guaranty has by no means been dormant.
An Act For the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. II, c. 3.
Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds now repealed and (with certain
changes) re-enacted by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, was as follows:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid that from and
after the 24th day of June no contract for the sale of goods, wares or
merchandizes for the price of LiC sterling or upwards, shall be allowed
to be good except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and
actually receive the same or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum in writing
of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by
such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
Section 7 of the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828, now repealed and
re-enacted by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, was as follows:
Be it enacted that the said enactments shall extend to all contracts
for the sale of goods of the value of ten pounds sterling and upwards
notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be delivered at some
future time or may not at the time of such contract be actually made,
procured or provided or fit or ready for delivery or some act may be
requisite for the making or completing thereof or rendering the same fit
for delivery.
' See Hening, The Original Drafts Of The Statute Of Frauds (29 Car. II c.
3) And Their Authors, 61 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 283, 303 if. (1913).
Report of the English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report
(1937), The Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine -of Consideration. Reprinted
in 15 Can. B. Rev. 585 (1937).
10
1Id. at 594. In June 1952 a Law Reform Committee was constituted by the
present Lord Chancellor. This Committee also studied the merits of the Statute
of Frauds. In April 1953 this Committee recommended that section 4 of the
Statute, except insofar as it relates to "any special promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another person," should be repealed. In effect
this proposal differs from the majority view of the Law Revision Committee
only in that the latter recommended a total abolition while the Reform Committee would retain contracts of guarantee. 1 Business Law Review (English)
6 (Jan. 1954).
" Id. at 617-618.
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In fact, the United States courts have been grinding out case after
case in a seemingly never ending struggle to bring out of chaos rational
propositions to be applied to Statute of Frauds cases. 12 Contemporary
cases obviously have a root base going back many years. These cases
are better explained by a full understanding of this historic background rather than by attempting to accept them at face value.
The pertinent part of the English Statute of Frauds for suretyship
reads:
No action shall be brought whereby ... to charge the defendant upon
any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of
another person . . . unless the agreement upon which such action shall
be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. 13
The test of whether the statute renders a particular oral promise
unenforceable is whether the agreement of the promisor is an original
and independent undertaking and not accessory or collateral to another
main contract, or whether it is collateral. Original promises are not
within the statute but collateral promises are.1 4 Difficulty arises, however, when this test is applied to a specific fact situation. In attempting
to distinguish independent from collateral promises, the courts have
laid down a great many tests, none of which are entirely satisfactory. 15
A number of outstanding writers have made noteworthy contributions to legal learning on this subject by classifying different types of
agreements which most courts have decided are not within the meaning and spirit of the statute. 16 After reading these texts, one learns
"-For an idea of the enormity of litigation and legal labor that has been
expended to reach the present indecisive status of the law on this subject with
all its subtleties, technicalities, and conflicts, see Willis, The Statute of FraudsA Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L. J. 427, 528 (1928).
11 See note 6 supra. The Nebraska Statute of Frauds provides: "In the following cases every agreement shall be void, unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party to
be charged therewith: .

.

. (2) every special promise to answer for the debt,

default or misdoings of another person.... ." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-202 (Re-issue
1952).
See 2 Williston, Contracts § 463 (Rev. ed. 1936).
15 "The fact that the promisor's undertaking is entered into subsequent to
the creation of the main obligation does not make it necessarily independent
of the main obligation. Again the fact that some benefit may accrue to the
promisor, or that he receives some consideration for his promise, does not
necessarily make his promise an independent one. The fact that the promisee
incurs some detriment or disadvantage as a result of the new promise is not
conclusive. On the other hand, the promise may be independent, even though
someone else's debt will be paid in consequence of performance of the contract and even though the original debtor remains liable after making the
promise." Stearns, The Law of Suretyship, (5th ed. 1951).
11 Merrill; 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit. supra note 1, at 413-434; Simpson, Suretyship, 113-164 (1950); Riesenfeld and Mussman. op. cit. supra note 5. at 1-34,
633-679; Restatement, Security -§§ 89-100; Stearns, -op. cit. supra note 15,
3.06-3.21.
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that there are more rules and subtleties providing for exceptions to the
statute than there are rules concerning when a certain fact situation
is within the statute., Thus, a short summary of the Statute of Frauds
is that all oral suretyship agreements are unenforceable except, except,
etc. However, most of these exceptions are well established and easily
found by reference to the standard texts and articles on the subject.
For example, the usually recognized exceptions are promises made to
the debtor; 17 where a legal duty of identical performance exists apart
from the oral promise;' 8 joint promises; 19 promises to indemnify; 20 the
del credere agent's promise; 21 promises in satisfaction of the duty of
another; 22 promises not originally subject to the statute where a third
person later assumes the duty, as in the case where a partner retires
from a partnership and the remaining partner agrees to assume all of
the partnership obligations; 23 promises made where no obligation
exists between the principal and creditor; 24 and promises where the
entire credit is given the promisor. 25
B. The Problem

Another well established exception, sometimes called the "new consideration theory," or the "leading object" or "main purpose" rule, is
recognized in one of these forms by all the authorities. 26 The true mean" Restatement, Security § 100 (1941); Simpson, Suretyship § 34 (1950);
2 Williston, Contracts §§ 460, 478 (Rev. ed. 1936); Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit.
supra note 1, at 420; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3.6.
"Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 91(c); Simpson, op. cit.
supra note 16, § 36; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 459; Stearns, op. cit.
supra note 15 at § 3.16.
11 Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 90(a); Simpson, op. cit. supra
note 16, § 37; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, § 466; Stearns, op. cit. supra note
15, § 3.14.
"0Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 96; Simpson, op. cit. supra
note 16, § 39; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, § 482; Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op.
cit. supra note 1, at 421-422; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3.10.
21

Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 98; Simpson, supra note

16, § 40; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, § 484; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15,
§ 3.21.
-2Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 92; 2 Williston, op. cit.
supra note 17, at § 477; Merrill, op. cit. supra note 1, at 422-423; Stearns ,op. cit.
supra note 15, § 3.18.
23
Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 95; Stearns, op. cit. supra
note 15, § 3.16.
2
' Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 89, illust. 3 and 5; Simpson,
op. cit. supra note 16, § 35, 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, § 454; Merrill, 8
Neb. L. Bull., op. cit. supra note 1, at 414; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3.12.

1
- Restatement, Security, op. cit. supra note 17, § 89, ilust. 4, 7 and 10;
2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 17, § 465; Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit. supra
note 1, at 415; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3.13.
2"6To illustrate an application and statement of the "new consideration" test,
see White v. Rintoul, note 86 infra. For an application and statement of the
"main purpose" or "leading object" rule, see Rose v. O'Linn, 10 Neb. 364, 6 N.W.
430 (1880).
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ing and application of this rule appears to be incapable of satisfactory
understanding and definition. This is the exception that Professor Merrill referred to nearly twenty-five years ago when he admonished the
Supreme Court of Nebraska to make a selection of some one definite
rule regarding this exception. 27 Applying this exception was the problem recently confronting the Supreme Court of Nebraska in deciding
28King v. Schmall.
Clearly a promisor cannot be made to answer for the debt of another unless someone else is primarily liable to the creditor. A promise
is not within the statute unless there is an obligation of another to
which it relates. 29 Part of the problem we are considering is whether
a person may by oral promise become originally liable for the same
antecedent debt for which another person continues to remain liable
3 °
to the same creditor.
C. The Origin of the "Main Purpose Rule" and the "New Consideration Test"

In 1756 Chancellor Hardwicke seems to have initiated these doctrines in Thomlinson v. Gill.1 Ten years later another landmark case,
Williams v. Leper,3 2 which was to greatly influence cases in both England and the United States, was decided. In the next forty-five years
two more English cases were decided that tended to develop the "main
purpose" doctrine before its adoption in America.33 After the rule was
transplanted to America it developed in the main along two different
trends. The most famous American cases developing these trends are
'Leonard v. Vredenburgh,34 decided in New York in 1811 and Nelson v.
Boynton,35 decided in Massachusetts in 1841. The first Nebraska case,
Rose v. O'Linn,36 was not decided until a generation later and at that
time the dictum of a great judge 37 in the early New York case above
was made the basis for deciding the Nebraska decision. Since the de'

See Note 3 supra.

"8See note 4 supra.

2'"It is very clear that a promisor cannot be made to answer for the debt
of another unless someone else is primarily liable to the creditor." Simpson,
Suretyship, 122-123 (1950). See also 2 Williston, Contracts § 454 (Rev. ed.

1936).

"o
For an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the New York cases involving
this same problem, see Conway, Subsequent Oral Promise to Perform Another's Duty and the New York Statute of Frauds, 22 Ford L. Rev. 119-154
(1953).

"Amb. 330, 27 Eng. Rep. 221 (1756).

Burr. 1886, 97 Eng. Rep. 1152, 2 Wils. 308, 95 Eng. Rep. 827 (1766).
11 Houlditch v. Milne, 3 Esp. 86, 170 Eng. Rep. 547 (1800); Castling v. Aubert,

323

2 East 325, 102 Eng. Rep. 393 (1802).

8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317 (1811).
3 Metc. (Mass.) 396, 37 Am. Dec. 148 (1841).
" Rose v. O'Linn, see note 26 supra.
"IJames Kent, at the time of his opinion in Leonard v. Vredenburgh, was
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York and later became Chancellor.
"
3
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cision in the first Nebraska case there has been doubt whether Nebraska has been following the New York or the Massachusetts approach. 38 In the meantime the doctrine enunciated in Massachusetts by
another great judge 39 was adopted by the American Law Institute as
the "majority rule" to be set out in the Restatements, 40 and the New
York doctrine grew from what was confusing dictum to its contemporary status that now is even more confounded.4 1 During the
years since 1880, Nebraska has had numerous opportunities to apply
its doctrine. 42 Is Nebraska continuing to follow the blind groping of
the New York judges, is it tending toward the Massachusettes and Restatement doctrine, or is it developing some independent view of its
own?
The FourBasic English Cases
Thomlinson v. Gill appears to be the English case originating these
doctrines. 43 The defendant made an oral promise that if the widow of
the intestate would permit him to be joined with her in the letters of
administration, he would make good any deficiency of assets to discharge the intestate's debts. The creditors of the intestate filed a bill
and defendant's oral promise was held to be enforceable on the ground
that the Statute of Frauds did not apply where the promise to pay the
44
debt of another was supported on a "new distinct consideration."
Williams v. Leper appears as a landmark case in the English law
and represents a basis for the development of this doctrine. An oral
promise by an assignee for benefit of creditors was held to not be within
the Statute of Frauds. The debtor had assigned his effects to the
defendant in trust for his creditors; the defendant advertised a sale
and on the morning advertised for the sale, the landlord came to dis' See note 3 supra.
See also Grether, Nebraska Annotations to the Restatement of Security § 93 (1950).

11 Referring to Chief Justice Shaw who wrote the opinion in Nelson v. Boy-

ton, see note 35 supra.
"Restatement, Security § 93 (1941); Restatement, Contracts § 184 (1932).
1 See note 30 supra at 119, 120. Professor Conway states that it is difficult,
if not impossible, on the basis of the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals, to state precisely what the law is today regarding the enforceability of
such oral promises. He further states that recent decisions of the courts make
it uncertain whether the announced rule now really means what it appears to
say. He concludes that we can only speculate as to the true meaning of the
New York test.
'For a list of Nebraska cases see Table Showing Nebraska Cases Correctly
or Incorrectly Decided According to Six Theories -of Enforceability of Oral
Promises to Answer for Debt of Another,. set out in this article, infra.
" Riesenfeld and Mussman, op. cit. supra note 5 at 659.
" Lord Hardwicke decided that the oral promise was not within the first
branch of Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds-a promise by an administrator
to answer damages out of his own estate--because the defendant was not an
-administrator at the time he made the promise. The chancellor regarded the
promise to the widow as being made in trust to her for the benefit of the
creditors.

CAVEAT PROMISSEE
train the goods in the house. The defendant, having notice of plaintiff's intention to distrain, promised to pay the rent owing if plaintiff
would desist from distraining; and thereupon plaintiff did desist. The
court must be understood as having considered the power of immediate distress and the intention to enforce it as equivalent to an
actual distress.45 Mr. Justice Aston thought that the defendant would
not be liable for any more than the amount received for the goods sold;
Mr. Justice Yates held that the defendant's promise was an admission
that the goods were sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand and that
defendant's promise created a new contract upon a good consideration;
Lord Mansfield's position was that the statute was not applicable because the plaintiff had released an existing lien, and payment was to
be made out of the fund; and Justice Wilmot decided that the defendant was bailiff for the landlord with respect to that portion of the proceeds of the goods as was covered by rent due. The court distinguished
a line of cases regarding oral promises in consideration of forbearance
to sue and did not cite the earlier case of Thomlinson v. Gill nor seem
to consider its rationale. In both cases, however, the promisor's motive
was to secure a benefit for himself rather than a desire to pay some
other person's debt. Although the judges agreed on the result in
Williams v. Leper, their reasons for the result were widely divergent.
Consequently, one can only speculate as to their result had they considered the Thomlinson case.
In the next case, decided thirty-four years later, Lord Eldon is reported to have held in Houlditch v. Milne4" that if a tradesman,
having goods in his possession upon which he has a lien, parts with
those goods on the promise of a third person to pay the demand, such
promise is not within the Statute of Frauds. In that case the defendant
sent the carriages of a third person to the plaintiff for repair. Thereafter, upon orders from the defendant, the carriages were placed on
board a ship, but only after the defendant had promised to pay for
the repairs. At most it can only be implied from the facts that the
defendant received an economic gain from the release of the lien and
that implication only from Lord Eldon's statement, "If a person got
goods into his possession, on which the landlord had a right to
distrain for rent, and he promised to pay the rent, though it
was clearly the debt of another, yet a note in writing was not necessary. '47 Lord Eldon relied on the Leper case in making his decision,

"See note by Serjeant John Williams, 1 Wins. Saund. 210 at 211, 85 Eng.
Rep. 217 at 224. The extensive note follows a Saunder's report of Forth v.
Stanton and is a useful summary of these early precedents. The note was written during the early 1800's.
46 See note 33 supra.
" Houlditch v. Milne, supra note 33, Esp. at 87, Eng. Rep. at 548 (emphasis
supplied).
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but in a note summarizing these early English precedents, Serjeant
Williams disagreed with Lord Eldon's rationale and reconciled the case
with the statement that the circumstances of the case showed the credit
to have been given to the defendant and that the real owner of the car48
riages was not liable.
The latest English case decided on this doctrine before the rule was
transplanted to the United States was Castling v. Aubert.49 In that
case C, who was D's broker, had policies of insurance in his hands belonging to D. These policies were security on which C had a lien for
the balance of his account; on the faith of this security C agreed to accept commercial paper for the accomodation of D. An action was
brought against C, as acceptor, and D as drawer, of a bill. The promisor
agreed to settle the acceptances due and to pay money to a banker
for the satisfaction of the remainder of the acceptances as they became
due if C would turn over the policies to the promisor so he could collect
from the underwriters money due from the policies for losses incurred.
All of the judges agreed that the Statute of Frauds was no defense to
the promisor where the promisee had released his lien on the insurance
policies in order for the promisor to collect on the policies.
Lord
Ellenborough stated that the amount collected on the policies was a
much larger amount than that for which the promisor agreed to indemnify the broker and that the promise was not induced by a desire
to attain the discharge of D, but rather the discharge of himself. In
the note written by Serjeant Williams, this case is explained on the
ground that it involved the purchase of an interest rather than a mere
undertaking to pay the debt of another.50 This was the first case emphasizing the factor of benefit to the promisor as well as detriment to
or reliance of the promisee. The motive of gaining some independent
economic interest for the promisor is thus suggested as a basis for exempting oral guaranties from the Statute of Frauds.
The American Doctrine
The English law had developed the "main purpose" or "leading object" rule to this point before any American precedent was developed.
The important and influential American cases transplanting the English doctrine into our law are those from the states of New York and
Massachusetts.
The most famous of these cases is Leonard v. Vredenburgh. James
Kent, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature of New
York, wrote the opinion containing dictum that since has been widely

"See note 45 supra, Wins. Saund. at 211, Eng. Rep. at 223.

"See
note 33 supra.
zoSee note 45 supra, Wms. Saund. at 211, Eng. Rep. at 223-224.
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quoted5 1 and furnished the basis for decisions in many cases. Kent's
dictum classified oral guaranty cases into three groups, and it is the
third group with which we are here concerned. In order to keep this
famous dictum in context, it is well to quote it as to all three classes:
There are, then, three distinct classes of cases on this subject, which
require to be discriminated: 1. Cases in which the guaranty or promise
is collateral to the principal contract, but is made at the same time, and
becomes an essential ground of the credit given to the principal or direct
debtor. Here, as we have already seen, is not, nor need be, any other
consideration, than that moving between the creditor and original
debtor; 52 2. Cases in which the collateral undertaking is subsequent
to the debt, and was not the inducement of it, though the subsisting
liability is the ground of the promise, without any distinct and unconnected inducement. Here some further consideration must be shown

having an immediate respect to such liability, for the consideration for
3. A
the original debt will not attach to this subsequent promise....
third class of cases, and to which I have already alluded, is when the
promise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new and original
consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting parties.
The first two classes of cases are within the statute of frauds, but the
last is not....

In spite of later misconstruction of his words, it does not appear that
Kent meant any consideration sufficient to support a contract would
render the statute inapplicable. He cited the cases of Tomlinson v.
Gill and Williams v. Leper, and the whole tenor of the opinion indicates
that the test is not absence of consideration, but that only an independent economic advantage of the promisor will render the statute
inapplicable.53 Kent's emphasis was that the new consideration had
to be moving between the newly contracting parties. Subsequent New
York cases have explained, modified and restated this famous dictum
but to date have failed to evolve a workable rule therefrom. 4 The
1 According to Shepard's New York Court of Appeals Citations, Leonard v.
Vredenburgh has been cited by the United States Supreme Court and the
states of Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
West Virginia.
12 Leonard v. Vredenburgh was in this first category and decided on this
rule, so that the next two classifications are only dictum.
11 The fact that the Chief Justice spoke at another place in the opinion, "Of
some new and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the
newly contracting parties" explains why there was some confusion as to the
"true meaning of the dictum. But the whole opinion taken in context clearly
shows that Kent did not mean to include the mere forbearance cases, and it
is not conceivable that he was thinking of a harm moving between the parties,
whatever that could mean. Thus, the words "or harm" should be ignored. Cf.

Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, 20 Col. L. Rev. 153, 164 (1920).
11 Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412 (1860), the test requires a beneficial con-

sideration moving to the promisor. Brown v. Weber, 38 N.Y. 187 (1868), as-
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failure of the New York bench is an interesting result 55 and is considered later in this article.
The Massachusetts development of the rule under consideration has
been second only to New York in influencing the American position.
Chief Justice Shaw wrote the opinion in Nelson v. Boynton which has
been credited as being the origin of the modern doctrine.56 The classic
expression of the "leading object" or "main purpose" test from the pen
of Chief Justice Shaw is that ".... When the party promising has for his
object a benefit which he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately
to himself," the promise is not within the Statute; but where "the object of the promise is to obtain the release of the person or property
of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to him, it is within the
57
statute."
D. The Nebraska Cases

Professor Merrill has already analyzed, discussed and summarized
the facts of the early Nebraska cases.5 8 No useful purpose would be
served by a reiteration of this scholarly work, although this writer is
not in complete accord with the characterization of Nebraska cases

made in that article. The accompanying table (page 588), however, will
provide a brief of these cases as classified by Professor Merrill. The
table also shows that there is no pattern to these cases insofar as deciding whether the case is or is not within the Statute. Both the New York
and the Massachusetts developments have shown a marked influence

in the Nebraska cases. The present writer thoroughly agrees with Professor Merrill, however, that no definite statement of the Nebraska law
can be gleaned from those cases. Furthermore this writer believes that
if it is not impossible, it is at least difficult, to state precisely what the
law is today on the enforceability of these oral promises. Nevertheless
four cases subsequent to Merrill's article will be discussed for an
analysis of the cases to date, so that one may better guess what the

Nebraska test is and more intelligently ponder the problem of where
to go from there.
Chronologically speaking, the first of these cases is Elson v. Nelson."9
Plaintiff threshed grain on which the defendant bank held a chattel
mortgage. Plaintiff sued the bank on its oral promise to pay for the
threshing, but the bank denied the direct promise and alleged that
serted that a promise might still be collateral even though the new consideration moved to the promisor and was beneficial to him. This case relates the
test to be whether the party sought to be charged is the principal debtor primarily liable or whether he only is liable in case of the default of a third
person.
See note 30 supra.
= See Throop, Validity of Verbal Agreements § 596 (1870).
See note 35 supra, 3 Metc. (Mass.) at 402, 37 Am. Dec. at 151.
"Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit., supra note 1, at 423-434.
69 132 Neb. 532, 272 N.W. 551 (1891).
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after part of the grain had been threshed, it promised the plaintiff to
allow the owner of the wheat to retain enough proceeds from the sale
of grain already threshed and to be threshed to pay the plaintiff for
his work. The bank alleged that it permitted the owner to retain
such proceeds, denied that it made any agreement to pay the thresher
and claimed that any such agreement would be void under the Statute.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of the plaintiff relying on Peyson v. Conniff, 60 which is an "entire credit test" case 0 ' and
thus is not in point so far as the rule discussed in this article is concerned. Aside from a procedural question, the Court stated that the case
was not within the statute because "the promise of the bank to pay
for the threshing was a direct promise to pay. It was based upon a
good consideration . . .- 62 Whether the court was referring to the
"new consideration" theory is problematical, although there was reference to some earlier Nebraska cases. The court cited cases supporting
various theories without appearing to be conscious that there was any
difference in them."
Consequently, the decision in Elson v. Nelson
makes practically no legal contribution beyond determining the rights
of the parties litigant.
Four years later the Supreme Court had its next chance to unscramble the existing confusion and make a definite selection of some
one view with reference to these situations. In Johnson v. Anderson 64
an attorney sued the promisor for his oral promise to pay the attorney's fee for defending another in a criminal case. The attorney
got an acquittal in the criminal case and then brought action on the
oral promise for his fee, the promise to pay the fee being made after
completion of the trial. In the law action to recover the fee the lower
court held for the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that the oral promise was within the statute of
frauds. No indication was given in the opinion that earlier cases were
being overturned or reconciled. The court based its decision on a
statement from Ruling Case Law, 65 but also cited three Nebraska cases.
While the statement from Ruling Case Law is more like the New York
Neb. 269, 49 N.W. 340 (1937).
See note 5 supra.
02 132 Neb. 532, 534, 272 N.W. 552 (1891).
63 An illustration of indiscriminate citation of cases by the early Nebraska
Supreme Court is the citing of Romberg v. Hughes, 18 Neb. 579, 26 N.W. 351
(1888) in Clay v. Tyson, 19 Neb. 530, 56 N.W. 240, 241 (1886). (Interestingly
enough, the report of this case in the Northwestern Reporter omitted the citation of Romberg v. Hughes.) The proposition for which the case was cited
was that a direct promise to pay is not within the Statute of Frauds and need
not be in writing. However, a reading of the case discloses that it has nothing
to do with the Statute of Frauds or any other relevant matter either expressly
or by implication.
6,140 Neb. 78, 299 N.W. 340 (1941).
6 See note 88 infra.
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Kent's test: In Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29 (1811)
Chief Justice Kent by way of dictum said that when the promise to
pay the debt of another arises out of some new and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contractingparties
the case is not within the Statute of Frauds.See footnote 87 as to subsequent requirements of this rule in New York.
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Shaw's test: In Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met. (Mass.) 396, 402 (1841)
Chief Justice Shaw wrote: "that cases are not considered as coming
within the statute,when the party promising has for his object a benefit
which he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself; but
where the object of the promise is to obtain the release of the person
or property of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to him, it is
within the statute." This test is basically section 93 of the Restatement
of Security.
Clifford's test: In Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28, 43 (1859), Mr. Justice Clifford phrased the leading object rule in the following manner:
"But whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to
answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving either a benefit to himself or damage to the
other contractingparty, his promise is not within the statute, although
it may be in form a promise to pay the debt of another, and although
the performance of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing
that liability."
Maxwell's test: Mr. Justice Maxwell in Fitzgerald v. Morrissey,
14 Neb. 198, 15 N.W. 233 (1883), described the rule as follows: "where
the leading purpose of a person who agrees to pay the debt of another
is to gain some advantage, or promote some interest or purpose of his
own, and not to become a mere guarantoror surety of another's debt,
and the promise is made on a sufficient consideration,it will be valid
although not in writing ... In such a case the promisor assumes the
debt and makes it his own. The promise is a direct undertaking on the
part of the person promising to pay the debt-not to pay if the debtor
fails to pay." This view apparently does not restrict the motive which
forms the leading object to the promotion of a business or pecuniary
advantage so long as it is something desired by the promisor it is
enough.
Williston's test: Williston, Contracts§ 475 (Rev. ed. 1936) states that
the "true test is whether or not the new promisor is a surety." Therefore, "if, as between himself (the new promisor, words supplied) and
the original promisor, the debt really ought to be paid by the latter,
whatever may be the other elements of the transaction, the new
promisor is on principle and in fact promising to answer for the debt
or default of another. Though he is led to do this by consideration of
his own advantage,the ultimate fact that the debt is another's is none
the less true.
Arant's test: Dean Arant expressed the view that since the policy
of the Statute of Frauds is to protect defendants from being held liable
through fabricated oral testimony upon promises which they never
made, the promises should be held to lie outside the statute, if, in the
main purpose cases, circumstances are present which remove the danger of perjury and corroborate the plaintiffs case. See Arant, A.
Rationale for the Statute of Frauds in Suretyship Cases, 12 Minn.
L.R. 716 (1928), particularly at 727-738.
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development, 6 two of the cited Nebraska cases adhere to the Massachusetts development of the rule. 7 The third Nebraska case cited
is more of an unclassifiable hybrid.68
A few years later the Supreme Court of Nebraska had another opportunity to reconcile or overturn these earlier Nebraska cases when
In re Estate of Allen 9 was decided. This is the only Nebraska case
in which the individual Justices of the Supreme Court appear to have
been unable to reach unanimity of opinion regarding application of
this section of the Statute of Frauds.70
In the Allen case, Jane Allen was divorced from her husband and
had a decree for 25 dollars per month support money for her three
children. The decree for the small sum of 25 dollars per month resulted
from a stipulation between the parties to the divorce suit. This stipulation was induced by an oral promise from the children's paternal grandfather to pay the 25 dollars per month to Jane Allen if she would forego her demand for the higher sum of 75 dollars per month, which sum
she was intending to ask the court to decree. The grandfather's promise
was made because he felt that he wanted to do something for his
grandchildren and help provide for them. He could not afford more
than 25 dollars per month, but felt that his daughter-in-law would be
better off to accept his offer thereby being assured of receiving a certain amount each month. After the grandfather died, this action was
brought against his estate for judgment on his oral promise.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court reversed with directions to the lower court to dismiss the action. The
majority opinion held that the promise came within the Statute, and
that in fact there was no consideration at all flowing to the promisor,
thereby leaving nothing but a nudum pactum agreement. The appellee
had argued that there was consideration in that the grandfather's
promise to pay was in lieu of an obligation imposed upon him by statute
to support pauper grandchildren. The court held, however, that the
statute did not fx liability, and, that before such liability could be
established under the statute, it must first be proved that the mother

11 See note 54 supra.
1 Morrissey v. Kinsey, 16 Neb. 17, 19 N.W. 454 (1884); Rose v. O'Linn, 10
Neb. 364, 6 N.W. 430 (1880).
I' Union Loan & Savings Ass'n. v. Johnson, 118 Neb. 17, 223 N.W. 467 (1929).
For an analysis of this case see Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit. supra note 1, at
418 ff.
70

147 Neb. 909, 25 N.W.2d 757 (1947).

The case was heard by Justices Simmons C. J., Paine, Carter, Messmore,
Yeager, Chappell and Wenke. Justice Yeager wrote the opinion for the Court.
Chief Justice Simmons and Justice Wenke concurred in the result. Justice
Paine wrote a dissenting opinion.
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was a poor person and unable to earn a livelihood in consequence of
some bodily infirmity, idiocy, lunacy or other unavoidable cause. 1
Justice Paine in his dissent stated: "This dissent is based upon the
approved rule that 'The applicability of the statute to an oral promise
does not depend upon the question as to whether there is a consideration for the promise which would be sufficient to support it if it were
not for the Statute of Frauds. The real question is whether or not
the consideration is of a character which stamps the promise as an
original one.... If the benefit accruing is direct and personal, then the
promise is original within the rule, and the validity thereof is not
affected by the Statute of Frauds.' Annotation, 8 A.L.R. 1199."172
Other language in the dissent indicates a belief that the court should
not strictly adhere to the letter of the statute and goes so far as to state
the following: "...
even though the effect of the promise is to pay
off the debt of another, yet if the evidence discloses that the prime purpose and object of the agreement are to carry out some design and interest of his own, it is unaffected by the statute, because it is an original
promise, made on a good consideration, of benefit or harm, moving be'73
tween the newly contracting parties.
Such statement of the rule goes even farther in relaxing strict application of the statute than does the "main purpose" rule.74 Nevertheless, it seems generally to embody the philosophy of the "main purpose" rule and appears to be related to the Massachusetts development.
On the other hand, it also suggests that the dissenting Justice was in
opposition to other members of the court who were inclined to follow
the New York development adopting the "new consideration" theory.
However, the majority of the court may have felt that the case did not
turn on a question of the Statute of Frauds so much as on the question
of whether there was consideration to support a simple contract.
In the most recent case, decided last year, the Court apparently applied the Statute strictly and followed the "new consideration" doctrine. In King v. Schmal175 the subcontractor refused to continue the
performance of his furnace and heating equipment and installation
contract because of the prospective failure of the general contractor
"Every poor person, who shall be unable to earn a livelihood in consequence of an unavoidable cause, shall be supported by the father, grandfather,

mother, grandmother, children, grandchildren, brothers, or sisters of such poor
person if they or either of them be of sufficient ability ..

."

Neb. Rev. Stat.

§ 68-101 (Reissue 1950).
2

See note 69 supra, 147 Neb. at 929, 930, 25 N.W.2d at 768.
• See note 69 supra, 147 Neb. at 925, 25 N.W.2d at 765.
' Contrast Justice Paine's statement of the approved rule, note 72 supra, as
conditioned by his latter statement, note 73 supra, with that of the main purpose rule found in § 93 of the Restatement of Security which requires a prime
motive of serving some"
11 See note 4 supra.

...

pecuniary or business advantage..

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

to make agreed payments. To induce further performance by the subcontractor the owner of the building promised to pay the subcontractor.
The subcontractor thereupon completed his contract. Afterwards, the
general contractor became bankrupt. The subcontractor first attempted to foreclose his mechanic's lien but failed because it had been filed
too late. Next, he sued the owner on her promise to pay. In the lower
court the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. However, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and decided as a matter of
law that the owner's promise was within the Statute and unenforceable.
In order to harmonize King v. Schmall with the earlier Nebraska
precedents, the court had only two Nebraska cases to compare, assuming building contract cases are regarded separately. These two earlier
cases, Fitzgerald v. Morrissey76 and Morrissey v. Kinsey,77 involved
promises to pay laborers' wages if they would continue their work.
The former case held the oral promise not to be within the statute,
and the latter case held just the opposite. Those two cases are not
necessarily contrary because they may be distinguishable by the form
of the promise made. In the Fitzgeraldcase there was a direct promise
to pay, and in the Kinsey case the promise was "would see it [the debt]
paid for, providing Schindler did not pay for it. '7 8 Applying the test
to the language in which the promise is phrased, the result in King v.
Schmall is in harmony with the two earlier contractor cases because
the form of the promise made by Mrs. Schmall was "You don't have
to worry. I have Mr. Messerschmidt bonded. I'll see you get your
money." If the case is to be explained solely on the ground that the
form of the promise is conditional, Nebraska is adopting a rule contrary
to the general view and deciding the rights of parties on the superficial basis of laymen's accidental choice of words rather than on their
substantive intent and true nature of their agreement. 79 This technique has little relevance to the supposed policy of preventing frauds and
perjuries. However, it may be a better explanation of the case than
the "new consideration" test.
The court's opinion in King v. Schmall also takes the position that
there was no new consideration to the owner because the plaintiff was
under contract to the general contractor to furnish and install the furnaces and the general contractor had promised to build the duplexes
for a contract price which the owner paid to the general contractor.
This conclusion was reached despite testimony that the subcontractor
would not have performed his contract had it not been for the owner's
promise to see him paid, that the owner had told him she had to have
14 Neb. 198, 15 N.W. 233 (1883).
,Morrissey v. Kinsey, note 67 supra.
' For the Nebraska view as to the effect of a promise "to see a debt paid,"
see Merrill, 8 Neb. L. Bull., op. cit. supra note 1, at 416-418, 431.
" See Stearns, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3.7.
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heat in the duplexes because the plasterers and painters needed it and
that she had to get the work finished so the renters could move in.
Inasmuch as the appellate court decided the issues as a matter of law,
it remains uncertain what kind of benefit will be deemed sufficient
consideration moving to the promisor to remove a promise from the
statute. Obviously, it is something more than the necessary consideration to make a valid contract; but how much more? The court's
reasoning as to consideration leads to the possibility that in all subcontractor cases owner promises are unenforceable, if oral, because the
owner never receives anything to which he was not entitled under his
contract with the general contractor."0
A curious point about the case is that the appellee's brief states
that the owner settled with the bonding company for a "sum of
money."81 Why did the subcontractor fail to get satisfaction from the
bond, which was stated to be a "general performance obligation"?S2
Nebraska cases hold that a laborer or materialman is a third-party
beneficiary of a general obligation bond, and any settlement between
surety and owner should not bar the third party's rights.8 3 Furthermore, if the owner's settlement with the surety could have included
a sum for the subcontractor's non-performance, had he not relied
on the owner's promise, there might be some consideration to the
owner in that she bargained with the subcontractor for a completion
of his performance without delay, time being essential for the purpose of getting the premises rented.
Nevertheless, if we classify this case on the basis of the Supreme
Court's reasoning as expressed by the language and mode of expression
" For a general discussion of the building cases see 2 Williston, Contracts
§ 481 (Rev. ed. 1936). Walsh and Simpson, 1 Cases and Materials on Security
Transactions 67 (1942), classifies the building cases into the following categories: (a) Where the general contractor has abandoned the contract and the
promise of the owner relates to future work. Schoenfeld v. Brown, 78 Ill. 487
(1875); Wilhelm v. Voss, 118 Mich. 106, 76 N.W. 308 (1898); Yeoman v. Mueller,
33 Mo. App. 343 (1889); Kutzmeyer v. Ennis, 27 N.J.L. 371 (1859); Crawford
v. Edison, 45 Ohio St. 239, 13 N.E. 80 (1887); Manetti v. Doege, 48 App. Div. 567,
62 N.Y. Supp. 918 (1900); Slotnick v. Smith, 252 Mass. 303, 147 N.E. 737 (1925).
(b) Where the owner promises payment merely from whatever may still be
due by him to the general contractor. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole, 258
Fed. 169 (1919), S. R. H. Robinson & Son Contracting Co. v. Twin City Bank,
103 Ark. 219, 146 S.W. 523 (1912). (c) Where the owner promises absolutely to
pay, irrespective of any balance due the general contractor, the latter remaining liable to the promisee subcontractor. Collins v. Abrams, 276 Mass. 106,
176 N.E. 814 (1931); Parisi v. Hubbard, 226 App. Div. 280, 235 N.Y. Supp. 220
(1929); Willox v. Townsend, 245 Mich. 632, 223 N.W. 226 (1929); Corcoran v.
Huey, 231 Pa. 441, 80 Atl. 881 (1911). See also note 99 A.L.R. 79 (1935).
81785 Nebraska Supreme Court Briefs, Docket No. 33249, Brief of Appellees
46.
8.Id. at 18.
83
For a collection of cases, see Grether, Nebraska Annotations to the Restatement of Security § 165 (1950).
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the Court used in the opinion, the case is a strong precedent for the
proposition that Nebraska has now decided to follow the "new consideration" test. On the other hand, one should not completely ignore
the fact that from the testimony regarding whether the promise was
in fact made, there was strong conflict which, justifiably or not, raises
doubt as to the validity of the jury's finding of fact.84
E. Conclusion
Judging from the decisions of the four Nebraska cases, the writer
is of the opinion that the Nebraska Supreme Court is now adhering to
the "new consideration" test in determining which oral promises shall
fall outside the Statute of Frauds.
New ConsiderationTest-Gloomy Prediction
Whether the test now propounded will have an enlightening effect
upon a heretofore unclarified and irreconcilable phase of case law is
highly doubtful.
There is no historical justification for choosing the "new consideration" test rather than the "main purpose" rule. One would suppose that
the New York courts who formulated and projected the "new consideration" test would have the problem resolved, after a century of
judicial thought, into a well-settled principle of law. Strange as it may
seem the courts of this great state with all their great jurists of the
past and present have not been able to unscramble their conflicting
cases and to state a rule which has a substantial degree of predictability
when applied to a particular set of facts.
In a recent article Professor Francis Conway made an exhaustive
analysis of the New York decisions regarding subsequent oral promises
to perform another's duty. 5 His conclusion was that the rule in New
York today is completely unclarified, and any attempt to reconcile the
cases would bring only speculation as to the true meaning of White v.
RintoulsG a leading New York case expounding the "new consideration"
test. The expression of this rule is as follows:
...where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently contracted,
the promise to pay it is original when it is founded on a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, and such that the
promisor thereby comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.8 7
""Two conflicting tendencies have been evident for the whole two hundred
and seventy years. One of these is to regard the statute as a great and noble
preventative of fraud and apply it against the plaintiff with a good conscience
even in cases where no doubt exists that the defendant made the promise with
which he is charged. The other and much more frequent one is to enforce
promises that a jury would find to have been in fact made, and if necessary
to this end to narrow the operation of the statute." 2 Corbin, Contracts § 275
(1950).
't Conway, op. cit. supra note 30.
White v. Rintoul, 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has chosen the following quotation
from Ruling Case Law as the rule to be applied within its jurisdiction:
it is said that a consideration to support a promise, not in writing,
to pay the debt of another must be of a peculiar character, and must
operate to the advantage of the promisor, and place him under a pecuniary obligation to the promisee independent of the original debt, which
obligation is to be discharged by the payment of that debt.88
...

Comparing the two above statements of the "new consideration"
rule, it would appear that Nebraska has extended its rule even farther
than New York. Under the New York doctrine the consideration required need only be "new consideration moving to the promisor," while
the Nebraska statement of the rule is that "a consideration to support
a promise must be of a peculiar character... ." Further, it would appear that the New York doctrine only requires consideration to support
an ordinary contract, while Nebraska would require more. However,
such is not the case. Even New York, like Nebraska, requires that the
consideration must not only be sufficient to support the promise, but
0
also of such a nature as to take the promise out of the statute.8
The difficulty in applying this test is obvious. Whether the promise
will fall within or without the statute will depend entirely upon each
87

Id, 108 N.Y. at 227, 15 N.E. at 320. Though Professor Conway in his article,
supra note 30, concluded that although the New York decisions regarding the
enforceability of these oral promises were in utter confusion, he also stated
that, generally, the courts were relying upon, the dictum of Brown v. Weber,
38 N.Y. 187, 191 (1868): ". . the receipt-or non-receipt of the consideration
by the party promising, does not determine in every case whether it is within
the statute or not, but that the inquiry still remains whether he entered into an
independent obligation of his own, or whether his responsibility was contingent upon the act of another." Evidence of his cautious statement is found
in the more recent decisions of Witschard v. Brody & Sons, Inc., 257 N.Y. 97,
117 N.E. 385 (1931) and Bulky v. Shaw, 289 N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.2d 398 (1942). Both
of these cases approve Professor Williston's view which is that the true test of
the validity of a new oral promise is to determine whether the new promisor
is a surety, and, if as between the promisor and the original debtor, the promisor
is bound to pay, the debt is his own and not within the statute. This same view
was also expressed in Mallory v. Gillett, supra note 54 and Richardson Press
v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918). Under this view an oral promise
to answer for another's debt would never be enforceable if the original debtor
remained liable since it adheres strictly to the letter of the statute. For the
meaning and application of the test in White v. Rintoul, see Burdick, op. cit.
supra note 54 at 178.
25 R.C.L. 495 (1929). See Johson v. Anderson, 140 Neb. 78, 299 N.W. 340
(1941).
81 "There must be a consideration in every case even if the promise is in
writing. But a consideration is not of itself sufficient to supply the place of
a writing where one is necessary. To take the case out of the statute there
must be a consideration moving to the promisor, either from the creditor or the
debtor. It must be beneficial to the promisor. That is the feature which imparts to the promise the character of an original undertaking." Ackley v.
Parmenter, 98 N.Y. 425, 433 (1885).
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factual situation, and very few, if any, case precedents will guide the
court in its decision.
After the decision of King v. Schmall any laborers or materialmen
who supply services or materials to a contractor, and who continue performance because of oral promises of reimbursement by the owner,
will be unable to enforce the oral promise unless it be shown that the
owner received more of a benefit than did Mrs. Schmal1. Would this
decision be of any value as a guide in deciding a case in which the
promisor's benefit was forbearance of suit? Continued occupancy of
premises? Release of lien? It would seem that in each case the
sufficiency of consideration and resulting.benefit to the promisor would
have to be compared with the relative total value of the contracted
debt, e.g., forbearance to sue the promisor in a large damage action
might be sufficient consideration to take the promise out of the statute
where the anticipated amount of damages is more than the assumed
debt, whereas, forbearance to sue upon a minor trespass might not. In
each case different amounts of debts to be assumed would require
different comparison standards as to the benefit derived.
Main Purpose Doctrine-A Better Test?

After so many years of judicial debate on this test resulting in no
present satisfactory method of application, it should be clear that instead of continually trying to reconcile decisions and further confuse
what is already confusing, some type of constructive effort should be
made to clarify the issue and even change the law if need be.90
Professor
Wi
Williston suggests eight tests which might distinguish promises
and take out of the Statute of Frauds the oral promise to answer for the debt
of another. 2 Wiliston, Contracts §§ 467-475 (1936). § 467: ". . . a promise to
pay a debt or perform a duty if another person fails to do so, is within the
Statute, but that a promise may be made orally if it is absolute in terms to
pay the debt of a person primarily liable irrespective of any prior default by
the latter." § 468:

"...

that the applicability of the Statute depends upon

whether the promise in question is in terms to pay the debt of another, so
that the contract by its very language makes the measure of the promisor's
liability identical with that of another, who as between the two is the one who
should discharge the obligation." § 469: ". . . a new promise is presumptively
within the Statute of Frauds unless the original debt is discharged." § 470:
This section talks of the main purpose or object of the promisor as a test.
§ 471: . . . where the new promisor makes the debt his own, the promise is
not within the Statute." § 472: "....that the surrender to the new promisor

of property which was held by the creditor as security for his claim prevents
the promise from falling within the Statute." § 473: "Whether the consideration for a new promise is received as the equivalent of a debt." § 474: the
Modern English test that "application of the Statute [depends] not on the
consideration for the promise, but on the fact of the original party remaining liable, coupled with the absence of any liability on the part of the
defendant or his property, except such as arises from his express promise."'
Professor Williston states what he believes to be the true test of validity in
§ 475: "Unless . . . a complete novation with the creditor takes place, the
only promise which can be within the Statute is that of the new promisor. If,
as between himself and the original promisor, the debt really ought to be paid
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The "main purpose" rule has gained favor with the courts throughout most of the jurisdictions9 ' and hds as its test the purpose or object
of the promisor in making the promise,. rather than focusing the entire
attention upon sufficiency of.considekition.It was stated earlier that under the "new consideration" test the
consideration must support the promise to pay the debt and also take
the promise out of the statute. The thing to be looked at in the "main
purpose" or "leading object" rule is not whether the consideration is
enough to cover the debt itself plus something more, but rather whether
it provides -evidence of the promisor's real purpose to subserve some
pecuniary or business advantage of his own which he previously did
not have. The fact that the benefit moving to the promisor is not,
moneywise at least, the equivalent of or more than the assumed debt
is immaterial since the rule is based on the theory that the parties bargained for their position, and it represents the equivalent of the obligation undertaken.92
Hence, in order to take the promise out of the statute under the
"main purpose" rule, the requirement would be that the pecuniary or
business advantage gained by the promisor is so much a benefit to
him as to justify the promise. As a practical matter, no great degree
of difficulty would be anticipated in determining the purpose behind
the promise in most cases since it would follow from the bargaining
of the parties. Further, it is hard to conceive of many cases in which
one would be desirous of paying another's debt without some form of
remuneration or other benefit. If such cases arise the promise would
be unenforceable under either test, being nudum pactum.
No doubt one of the purposes behind the statute is to prevent persons from enforcing promises which either do not exist or have been
misinterpreted. The statute worked a real hardship on the innocent
promisee while at the same time serving the public good in deterring
by the latter . . .the new promisor is on principle and in fact promising to

answer for the debt or defaut of another... On the other hand if, as between
the original debtor and the new promisor, the latter ought to pay the debt, he
is promising to answer for his own debt, not that of another, the true test,
then, is the existence of the relation of principal and surety between the new
promisor and the other party also bound for the same obligation..."
"Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 396 (1841); Emerson v. Slater, 22
How. 28 (1859); Simpson, Suretyship § 38 (1950); Arant, Suretyship, § 36

(1931); Stearns, Law of Suretyship, § 39 (1934); Restatement, Contracts § 184;
the rule is discussed in 2 Williston, Contracts § 472 (1936), but see § 475 wherein he expresses his view that the validity of the oral promise depends upon
whether the new promisor is a surety. For a view similar to that of Professor
Williston, see I Brandt, Suretyship, Guaranty § 81 (3d ed. 1905).

92 "If the beneficial consideration received, whether moving from the debtor
or from the creditor, is equivalent or is bargained for as the equivalent of
the obligation undertaken, then even though the debt of another continues to
exist the oral promise is outside the statute as a promise to answer for the
debt which is the promisor's own." Simpson, Suretyship § 38 at 147-148 (1950).
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those with fraudulent designs. Because of this, the English courts
saw fit to make exceptions to it, and the "new consideration" and "main
purpose" tests grew out of such judicial attitude. Thus, the statute has
lost some of the vitality it once possessed.
However, the present application of the "new consideration" test
still seems to cling to the letter of the statute while the "main purpose"
test adheres more to its spirit by giving more weight and credence to
the bargain made by the parties.
The "main purpose" test as contended for here is set out in section
93 of the Restatement of Security. It is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has cited as authoritative some sections of
all the Restatements of the Law except the Restatement of Security,
even though it is one of the few which has never been amendedf 3
Though never having been cited, of the one-hundred and thirty sections
dealing with suretyship, 94 the Nebraska cases show sixty-six sections in
accord, fifty sections with no cases found to be in point, nine sections
contra, and five sections in confusion.95 In other words Nebraska law
coincides with over four-fifths of the sections in the Restatement relating to suretyship on which cases have been found to be in point and
is contrary to less than one-eighth of these sections.
In 1935 the Nebraska State Bar Association, after several years of
studying the merits of the work of the American Law Institute, adopted
the following report of the Committee on Cooperation wih the American Law Institute:
3. . Whereas, the American Law Institute Restatements of the Law
for the respective subjects covered thereby afford the most accurate and
the most authoritative systematic expression of what that general law is,

Restatement, Security (1941); Restatement, Restitution (1936); Restatement, Agency (1933).
13

"'Rlestatement, Security §§ 82-211 (1941).

"Any brief count of the Restatement sections pertaining to suretyship, as to
whether they are in accord or contra to established Nebraska law is necessarily
inaccurate so far as details are concerned. Without unduly extending this
footnote, it is impossible to designate certain sections as either being in accord,
contra, or uncertain for the reason that some sections contain a number of
different and distinct rules, and Nebraska law is in accord with some of these
rules but contra or uncertain as to the other rules under the same restatement
section. However, the following classification'is substantially correct: Accord:
§§ 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 100, 1,03, 104,105, 107, 109, 112, 114, 117, 119, 120, 122,
126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, i35, 136, i39, 140, 141, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152,

154, 155, 165, 169, 171, 173, 177, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194,
196, 197, 199, 201, 903,204, 205, 206, 207,'208 and 209. No cases found to be in
poifi: '§§ 85, 87, 94, 95, 98, 99, 106, 110, 111, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 127, 134,
327, 138, 143, 144, 145, 151, 153,*157, 158A; 159,'160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170,
172,174,-'175, 176, 178,'180, '186, 19i, 183 , 195, 198, 200, 202, 210, and 211. Contra: §§
82,93, 96, 102, 108, 116,'142, 166 bhd 18t. Found 'to be in confusion: §§, 86, 88,
101) 125 and 156:
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whose application often must be held to be justly controlling in the disposal of legal controversies, and
Whereas, the most important, if not the only effective way to secure
for the profession and for the public the greatest benefits of the Restatement is to achieve its widest use by the profession in the adjustment
and adjudication of controversies, therefore, be it
Resolved, that the Nebraska State Bar Association approves and
respectfully urges upon all judges in trial and reviewing court the already growing practice of asking from the bench, during argument of
pending cases, the substance of the following two questions:
a. In addition to possibly applicable statutes, decisions thereunder,
and available decisions of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, what does
the American Law Institute say, if anything, on the question of law in
controversy?
b. If so, how does the principle or rule of law set forth in the Restatement apply to the facts found in the pending case?9 G

It seems strange that in the face of such a strong recommendation
no reference has been made to the Restatement of Security, notwithstanding that this work was not completed until 1941.
It is therefore submitted that a change from the "new consideration"
test to the "main purpose" test would inject more certainty into this
confused phase of the law and would do much to resolve a great deal
of the difficulty. The rule contended for is in accord with that in
most jurisdictions, and, as set out in section 93 of the Restatement of
Security, represents the recommendation of many of this country's
most prominent writers, judges and attorneys.
A return to the application of this test would not be representative
of a drastic change, rather it would but re-align the previous Nebraska
97
decisions which followed the rule.
The Future of the Statute of Frauds

So much of Section 4 of the original enactment of the Statute of
Frauds of 1677 as is applicable to this problem is as follows:
No action shall be brought whereby to charge.., the Defendant upon
any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another person.. . unless the agreement upon which such action shall
be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith ... s

Although stated a little differently, the Nebraska statute is substantially the same. 9

"Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Nebraska Bar
Association, 15 Neb. L. Bull. 22, 23 (1936).
" For example, see Swayne v. Hill, 59 Neb. 652, 81 N.W. 855 (1900); Fitzgerald v. Morrissey, 14 Neb. 198, 15 N.W. 233 (1883); Clopper v. Poland, 12 Neb.
69, 10 N.W. 538 (1881).
"See note 6 supra.
"See note 13 supra.
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Looking at the statute today as contrasted with conditions existing
at its inception leads to the conclusion that much of its utility has been
lost.
After more than two-hundred and seventy-five years of its operation, eminent authorities have versed various opinions regarding its
merit. 0 0 Lord Kenyon called it "one of the wisest laws on our Statute
Book,"'' and added "I lament extremely that exceptions were ever introduced in construing the Statute."' 10 2 Of the opposite view was Wilmot, J., who concurred with by Lord Mansfield, said, "Had the Statute
of Frauds been always carried into execution according to the letter, it
would have done ten times more mischief than it has done good, by
protecting, rather than preventing frauds." Lord Nottingham used to
say of the Statute "that every line was worth a subsidy,"'10 3 and nearly
two centuries later, a learned lawyer replied "That every line has cost
a subsidy, for it is universally admitted that no enactment of any legislature ever became the subject of so much litigation."'0 ° 4 Professor
Holdsworth's comments were, "We no longer find them [the courts]
bestowing upon the statute the hearty praises bestowed by Kenyon and
Ellenborough. On the contrary, the prevailing feeling both in the
legal and the commercial world is, and has for a long time been, that
these clauses have outlived their usefulness, and are quite out of place
amid the changed legal and commercial conditions of today. ' 'l 0 5
In 1934 the English Law Revision Committee was appointed to
study certain enactments to determine whether they should be amended or repealed. 1
Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds was one of those
enactments studied. In their Sixth Interim Report it was concluded
that contemporary opinion was almost unanimous in condemning the
Statute and favoring its amendment or repeal, and, after careful study
10 7
its repeal was recommended.
The criticisms. of the Statute may be summed up as follows:
(1) The conditions of today no longer warrant its usage because at
the time of enactment, essential kinds of evidence were excluded,0 s
"I The opinions of the Chancellors for more than one hundred years after
the enactment of the statute are reviewed by Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of
Frauds, 37 Cornell L. Q. 355 (1952).
'Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East 182, 194 (1800).

Chater v. Beckett, 7 T.R. 201, 204 (1797).
Simon v. Metivier, 1 Bl. W. 599, 601 (1766).
Smith, Contracts 74 (7th ed. 1885) (English).
1016 Holdsworth, History of English Law 396 (1924).
See note 9 supra.
107 This recommendation may become law in the near future. See note 10
supra, note 120 infra.
108"It was a full half-century after the adoption of the Statute before an
English lawyer ever read or saw a treatise on the law of evidence. Not until
10-

101

1726, when Chief Baron Gilbert's little book [The Law of Evidence, 1726] on
that subject made its bow, did the profession learn the rudiments of that great
branch of remedial law. And it took almost another century to develop the
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e.g., the litigating parties could not personally give evidence since
juries were entitled to act on their own knowledge of the facts. Today the law allows the parties to freely testify. 10 9
(2) The Statute promotes rather than prevents fraud. 10 It prevents
perjury in some instances, but more frequently strikes at the honest
man who omitted a precaution, thereby allowing another to break the
promise with impunity. Though a hardship may result, a party who
relies on the promise to the extent of having completely complied with
the terms of the agreement is without remedy for its enforcement unless by action other than upon the agreement.-" Such an inequity
strikes at both promisor and promisee. Owners may part forever with
1 2
outstanding equities by their hasty but honest actions.
(3) The classes of contracts to which the statute is directed are
arbitrarily selected (a promise to answer for another's debt, default or
miscarriage is but one of the classes). There is no reason why these
contracts should be reduced to writing and not others." 3 Would not
consideration be required to bind the parties on these contracts just
as in any other contracts? And would not the consideration result from
the bargaining of the parties as in any other type of contract?
(4) Under the statute, if A and B contract and A signed a writing
or memorandum which B did not, B could enforce the contract against
A, but A could not enforce it against B.
(5) Contracts not in compliance with the statute are merely unenforceable yet not nullified. Therefore, in a situation where a contract which complied with the statute was replaced by agreement with

rules into a real science and make them an indispensible factor in the adjustment of disputes and the orderly trial of causes." Ireton, Should We Abolish
The Statute of Frauds, 72 U.S.L. Rev. 195, 197 (1939).
109 "We must also take into consideration a second contributory factor to
the passage of the Statute-the disability under which parties to a suit lay at
that time for almost two centuries thereafter, by which, on the ground of interest, they were prevented from testifying in their own cause." Ibid.
I" For an excellent exposition of the anomalous results created by the

Statute of Frauds see Willis, op. cit. supra note 12.
...
Refusal to perform an oral agreement, within the Statute of Frauds, is
not such a fraud as will justify a court in disregarding the statute, even though
it results in hardship to the plaintiff. Bulkey v. Shaw, 289 N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.2d
398 (1942).

"Such gain in the prevention of fraud as is attained by the statute is attained at the expense of permitting persons who have in fact made oral
112

promises to break those promises with impunity and to cause disappointment

and loss to honest men. It is this fact that has caused the courts to interpret
the statute so narrowly as to exclude many promises from its operation on
what may seem to be flimsey grounds. The courts cannot bear to permit the
dishonest breaking of a promise when they are convinced that the promise was

in fact made. The statute of frauds is regarded as a technical defense that often
goes counter to the merits." 2 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 84, § 275.
11

Willis, op. cit. supra note 12.
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one not so complying, neither contract would be enforceable because
the second validly replaced the first.
(6) The statute is out of accord with the way business is normally
done. The convenient use of the telephone as a medium for conducting business brings many transactions within the purview of the
statute, which, if conducted entirely by written agreement, would seriously handicap the intricate mechanism of the present commercial
world. Where out of necessity large scale business demands of its
participants rapidness in business judgment to maintain a competitive
status, e.g., stock and commodity exchange buyers, it often gives rise
to "gentlemens' agreements" which virtually ignore the statute.
(7) The statute creates needless litigation. Up to 1928, the Century,
First Decennial and Second Decennial Digests list, under the heading
of "Statute of Frauds," approximately 10,800 cases of which it is estimated that less than one-third fall within the statute.1 1 4 Although only
a part of these cases involve oral promises to answer for another's
debt, they are certainly indicative of a fruitless effort of a statute to
achieve the purposes for which it was originally intended.
This article does not intend to analyze in detail the pro and con
arguments of the statute in its entirety, although all the reasons set
forth would be applicable to it. An oral promise to "answer for the
debt, default or misdoings of another" is but one facet of the statute
which is considered here. It is the opinion of the author that this portion of the statute should be either amended or repealed.
The statute, having its roots so firmly planted within the law, is
not one which will be done away with overnight. The author urges
that legislative research be instituted to make a further study of the
merits of this statute.- 5 Continued use of such outmoded legislation
merely because it represents a part of our legal heritage affords no
sound or rational basis for its use today. Already a re-examination of
the Statute of Frauds is being undertaken by the New York Law Revision Committee.
An alternative to repealing the statute and thereby causing all oral
contracts to be equally enforceable is to amend the statute so as to provide an equitable means of protecting against fraud and perjury in the
types of contracts thought to require such protection. This could be
accomplished by using new procedural devices, new rules of evidence
and scientific means of proof.
If certain classes of contracts are thought to require safeguards
against perjury, the desired end might be achieved by requiring a
...
Willis, op. eit. supra note 12 at 537.
11.Already a re-examination of the Statute of Frauds is being undertaken by
the New York Law Revision Commission. 2 Williston, Contracts § 448 (Rev. ed.
1936, 1953 Cum. Supp.).
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higher degree of proof to establish the existence of the alleged oral
contract than usually is necessary in the ordinary civil action. Such
a suggestion gains merit if we keep in mind that the primary function
of a jury is fact finding. To ask or instruct a jury to decide if the fact
that a promise was actually made is established by clear and convincing
evidence is not different from requesting the same jury to decide the
guilt or innocence of an accused, or to decide if one person's negligence
is such as to bar a recovery from another who was also negligent.
Another method of preventing fraudulently alleged contracts is to
enforce only those contracts which are substantiated by some form of
corroboration. Under the present statute, a written agreement is the
only kind of corroboration sanctioned. However, corroboration of a
promise is possible by means other than a writing. There must be
corroborative evidence of the grounds alleged for a divorce, but the
acceptable corroboration is not limited to written documents."n
In
fact this writer doubts that a writing is the usual kind of corroboration
furnished by most of the parties successfully alleging grounds for
17
divorce.
It is very possible that modern inventiveness already has at hand a
scientific method for deternining the truth of whether a promise was
actually made. Corroboration of the alleged promise by successfully
convincing the "eagle eye" of a mechanical lie detector that the person
alleging the promise is telling the truth and the person denying the
promise is falsifying may well be a greater safeguard against proving contracts by perjured testimony than is the judgment of twelve
good jurors, tried and true."$
"16 "No decree of divorce and of the nullity of a marriage shall be made solely
on the declaration, confessions or admissions of the parties, but the court shall,
in all cases, require other satisfactory evidence of the facts alleged in the petition for that purpose." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-335 (Reissue 1952). See Haines v.
Haines, 79 Neb. 684, 113 N.W. 125 (1907).
"I Perhaps divorce is a peculiar situation involving different policy considerations and one where written evidence would be too difficult to obtain.

Nevertheless, the situation does provide an illustration that there are various

kinds of corroborative evidence.
11 "Mechanical lie detectors have been developed which have proved to be
accurate in over seventy-five per cent of the cases, but no proof is available
for the accuracy of verdicts of juries in judging the veracity of witnesses....
As things stand, the lie detector is rapidly becoming one of the most important
means of crime detection; but it is not yet tolerated in the courts even to be
introduced as evidence to a jury to say nothing of standing on its own merits
to replace the jury as a fact finding device, and there seems to be little research
in progress to develop it further as an evidentiary device." Beutel, The Lag
Between Scientific Discoveries and Legal Procedures, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 29, 30
(1953). Former director Fred Inbau and present director John E. Reid of the
Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory argue that exact figures
are unavailable to measure the accuracy of lie detector tests. However, they
present a sound basis for making an estimate. From five years experience of
examiners on the staff of John E. Reid and Associates, they conclude that when
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We have no reliable empirical data for determining whether the
statute prevents more frauds than it creates. We do know, however,
that in nearly three-hundred years the courts have failed to frame a
satisfactory statement of the rule discussed in this article. Already
we have lost much time in gathering the factual data regarding the
value of the Statute under modern conditions or concerning the possibility of using scientific methods to prevent perjury.119 Immediate research and study relating to the advisability of repeal or amendment of
the Statute of Frauds should be commenced by responsible law-revision commissions, scientific foundations and educational institutions.
The New York Law Revision Commission is now studying the statute,
and their research will undoubtedly prove valuable for other contemporary research groups. In addition we may soon have an opportunity to observe the actual effect of a repeal of the statute since
proposed legislation which would repeal the Statute of Frauds is now
20
pending in the British Parliament.1

tests are applied under the most favorable conditions an accuracy of 95 per cent,
with a 4 per cent margin of indefinite determinations and a 1 per cent margin of
possible error will result. Inbau and Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 110, 111 (3d ed. 1953).
11 "When one approaches what is generally regarded as the heart of the law
making and enforcement machinery, the legislatures and the courts, the absence
of scientific progress, machinery to support it or institutions devoted to research is shocking." Beutel, op. cit. supra note 117 at 27.
.- The Law Reform Committee referred to in note 10 supra, was appointed
in June 1952 and recommended that section 4 be repealed except the law pertaining to contracts of guaranty. On November 24, 1953 the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill was presented to Parliament This bill contained
provisions for the implementation of the suggestions made by the Law Reform
Committee. 1 Business Law Review (English) 6 (Jan. 1954).

